New Hampshire Supreme Court Reverses Superior Court – Finds Attorney’s Fees Recoverable for Post-Trial Proceedings in Landlord/Tenant Dispute
In a June 22, 2023, decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court (the “Court”) reversed an order issued by a superior court denying certain attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff Alex Luis Morales (“Morales”) in an action brought against Defendant Zenandre Braccio (“Braccio”) for violations of New Hampshire’s landlord/tenant law.
The underlying dispute arose when Morales sued Braccio, his landlord, for violating Morales’ right to quiet enjoyment and turning off his utilities. The superior court found in favor of Morales and ordered Braccio to pay $7,000.00 in damages, and further awarded him attorney’s fees and costs in accordance with New Hampshire law as the prevailing party.
After the final order was issued, Braccio moved to vacate the order, not once but twice, and was rebuffed both times. Morales then requested that the superior court award him additional attorney’s fees for his costs incurred in responding to Braccio’s post-trial motions, which the superior court denied. Morales thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court.
In reviewing the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Court first looked to its case law precedent established in Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471 (2006). In Simpson, the Court held that a prevailing plaintiff in an appeal may recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to RSA 540-A:4, IX. Braccio argued that the Simpson decision only applied to attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal, not those incurred in post-trial motion practice. The Court disagreed, referencing the plain wording of RSA 540-A:4, IX:
RSA 540-A:4, IX, provides that “[a]ny landlord, who violates, any provision of RSA 540-A:3 shall be subject to the civil remedies set forth in RSA 358-A:10 for the initial violation, including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings.” Emphasis added.
The Simpson Court found that in the context of RSA 540-A:4, IX, “proceedings” means “the regular and orderly progression of the lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgement.” Simpson, 153 N.H. at 480. In Simpson, the Court reasoned that because the trial court will not enter a final judgment until the conclusion of the appeal, an appeal is an act between the time of commencement and the entry of judgement, and thus, constitutes a “proceeding” upon which a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees. Id.
The Court held that the same reasoning applies to this scenario as it concerns the post-trial motion practice, and as the prevailing party, Morales was entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to RSA 540-A:4, IX.
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